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This paper theorizes about the convergence of international organizations in global health governance, a field of 
international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as particularly hit by institutional fragmentation. Unlike 
existing theories on interorganizationalism that have mainly looked to intra- and extraorganizational factors in 
order to explain why international organizations cooperate with each other in the first place, the paper is interested 
in the link between causes and systemic effects of interorganizational convergence. The paper begins by defining
interorganizational convergence. It then proceeds to discuss why conventional theories on interorganizational-
ism fail to explain the aggregate effects of convergence between IOs in global (health) governance which tend to 
worsen rather than cushion fragmentation – so-called “hypercollective action” (Severino & Ray 2010). In order 
to remedy this explanatory blind-spot the paper formulates an alternative sociological institutionalist theory on 
interorganizational convergence that makes two core theoretical propositions: first that emerging norms of
metagovernance are a powerful driver behind interorganizational convergence in global health governance, and 
secondly that IOs are engaged in a fierce meaning-struggle over these norms which results in hypercollective 
action. In its empirical part, the paper’s core theoretical propositions are corroborated by analyzing discourses 
and practices of interorganizational convergence in global health. The empirical analysis allows drawing two far-
reaching conclusions. On the one hand, interorganizational harmonization has emerged as a largely undisputed 
norm in global health which has been translated into ever more institutionalized forms of interorganizational 
cooperation. On the other, discourses and practices of interorganizational harmonization exhibit conflicts over the 
ordering principles according to which the policies and actions of international organizations with overlapping 
mandates and missions should be harmonized. In combination, these two empirical findings explain why interor-
ganizational convergence has so far failed to strengthen the global health architecture.
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RESTORING ORDER IN GLOBAL 
HEALTH GOVERNANCE:           
DO METAGOVERNANCE NORMS 
Affect Interorganizational   
Convergence?
1. Introduction
Let’s get our house in order. This imperative re-
sounds widely across the extensive landscape of ac-
tors which contribute to today’s global governance 
of health matters. Like no other field of interna-
tional concern, international cooperation in the area 
of health has evolved and diversified in the past 25 
years (Hein and Kickbusch 2010; Smith 1995; Tay-
lor 2002; The Lancet 2009 ) – to such an extent that 
global health governance is routinely captured in pic-
torial terminology revolving around chaos and mess. 
The gist of these portrayals is that today’s interna-
tional cooperation in the field of health is a cacopho-
nous “many-piece orchestra” (Hermias and Kharas 
2008) composed of (too) many actors, institutions 
and programs that perform without conductor. While 
the international response to HIV/AIDS in particular 
had helped to fortify this imagery of global health 
governance as a shambolic area of international co-
operation, it has, over time, crystallized into a persis-
tent truism about global health governance at large. 
This paper argues that while much scholarly effort 
has gone into studying the causes and effects of 
institutional fragmentation in global governance, 
the reverse centripetal movement towards order 
and architecture deserves more attention. At pres-
ent globally operating health agencies are engaged 
in a vigorous debate on reforming and strengthen-
ing the institutional architecture for global health. 
Most generally, global health governance is defined 
as transboundary cooperation to curtail communi-
cable and non-communicable diseases and ensure 
the best possible standard of health for populations 
around the world. In 1948, the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) was set up as the central interna-
tional health agency with a constitutional mandate 
to “act as a directing and co-ordinating authority 
on international health-work” (WHO Constitution, 
Chapter II, Article 2(a)). Ever since, the broaden-
ing mandates of other international organizations 
(World Bank, UNICEF, UNDP), the creation of new 
health-specific programs, funds and coordinating 
bodies (UNFPA, UNAIDS, Global Fund) and the 
increasing power of private actors such as the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation, have undermined the 
central authority of the WHO in many areas. Today, 
it is estimated that the global institutional landscape 
surrounding health is a fragmented, highly competi-
tive structure of over 100 international organizations 
(Godal 2005; OECD 2011b; Schieber, et al. 2007) 
whose formal and effective mandates collide in 
many cases (Lee, et al. 1996). While the WHO is still 
acknowledged as the central norm-setting authority 
in international health, there are conflicting spheres 
of authority between health IOs in operations; in 
the co-financing of health systems in developing 
countries; and in capacity-building (England 2009). 
There are various drivers behind the breakneck 
speed with which the institutional landscape in 
global health has expanded and diversified since the 
1990s, before all the rising prominence of health on 
two agendas central to international politics: inter-
national development and foreign policy. Official 
development assistance (ODA) for health has seen a 
five-fold increase since 1990 from US$ 5.6 billion in 
1990 (The Lancet 2009) to US$ 26.8 billion in 2010 
(Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2010: 
9). Between 2000 and 2010 alone, ODA for health 
has risen by 768 per cent.1  In the United States’ for-
eign aid budget funds for health (8.8 billion USD) 
now regularly outweigh funds for security related as-
sistance (at 8.4 billion USD).2  What is more, health 
has established itself as a most welcome attachment 
to foreign policy and security agendas, as the soft 
foreign intervention to win over people’s hearts and 
minds. And, over time, it has trumped other areas of 
foreign aid, because health interventions are suppos-
edly easy to measure and show the rapid impact of do-
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sures) (Natsios 2010). Finally, opinion polls consis-
tently confirm the high value that populations around 
the world attach to their own well-being and to the 
prominence of health on the development agenda.3 
While all of these factors have played a role in boost-
ing health-related issues on the global agenda it was 
the surfacing of infectious diseases such as HIV/
AIDS and, recently, Ebola as well as the health-fo-
cus of the Millennium Development Goals that has 
pushed health funding to historical levels (Piva and 
Dodd 2009).4  Following these developments we are 
presently facing an unprecedented number of ac-
tors and rule systems relevant to policy-making and 
implementation in global health. This makes many 
issues pertaining to the broad field of global health 
governance examples par excéllence for regime 
complexity in global governance – a phenomenon 
whose popularity in academic research is rising. 
Population control, access to essential medicines 
or the ethical recruitment of health personnel are 
all problems governed by regime complexes as “an 
array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical 
institutions“ (Raustiala and Victor 2004: 279) per-
taining to such rule-systems as human rights, re-
productive rights, labor regulation or intellectual 
property (Orsini, et al. 2013). Thus, many issues 
addressed in global health governance are ripe with 
interface conflicts between the intersecting, over-
lapping or nested rule-systems belonging to a spe-
cific regime complex (Alter and Meunier 2006). 
This paper starts from the essential observation that 
even though global health governance has come 
to be associated with frequent collisions between 
rule-systems and a byzantine landscape of institu-
tions and actors, many of these actors are united in 
their search for an appropriate architecture that can 
hold the many pieces of a global health mosaic to-
gether. Contemporary global health governance, 
thus, is as much about finding appropriate solutions 
to transboundary health problems as it is about re-
storing institutional order and carving out a global 
health architecture with which these problems can 
be adequately addressed (Kickbusch, et al. 2010). 
Whereas, for a long time, public and private actors 
have channelled their efforts into experimentation 
with new institutional designs for tackling health is-
sues,5 they are now increasingly searching also for 
the ‘master-design’, i.e. the optimal institutional 
meta-architecture that “orchestrates” the many-piece 
orchestra of global health governance (Abbott, et al. 
2015). This has never been more evident than dur-
ing the global crisis following the Ebola outbreaks 
in Western Africa in 2014.6  The international debate 
surrounding the ‘Ebola crisis’ has made it crystal 
clear that the global health discourse has shifted from 
one celebrating pluralization and valuing compet-
ing rule-systems, innovation and flexibility to one in 
which there is an unanimous call for order and large-
scale coordination (Gostin and Friedman 2014). 
Concrete attempts to restore institutional order in 
global health already abound: in the field of global 
public health, over seventy-five global initiatives and 
partnerships have been identified whose main pur-
pose lies in mitigating fragmentation and coordinat-
ing multilateral and bilateral contributions to health 
governance (Balabanova, et al. 2010). For any major 
global health issue today there exist one or multiple 
harmonization initiatives, such as, for example, the 
Harmonization Working Group that forms part of the 
Roll Back Malaria Partnership.7  Despite this trend 
towards convergence (which is by no means unique 
to health) IR scholarship on interorganizational-
ism is still underdeveloped and largely dominated 
by rationalist-institutionalist approaches. As I argue 
throughout this paper, the research agenda on inter-
organizationalizm in fragmented governance areas 
calls for theoretical and epistemological diversifica-
tion as soon as the systemic effects of interorganiza-
tional cooperation are at stake. To that end, I advance 
a norm-focused approach to interorganizationalism 
that permits to explain the interplay between driv-
ers of interorganizational convergence on the one 
hand and its systemic effects on the organizational 
field as a whole on the other. The paper puts forward 
the core theoretical proposition that the observable 
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convergence between global health agencies is an ef-
fect of so-called metagovernance norms, i.e. norms 
that relate to the appropriateness of interorganiza-
tional harmonization in global health governance. 
However, there is strong empirical evidence that 
as organizations translate metagovernance norms 
into concrete cooperative strategies and practices 
and intensify their interorganizational relationships, 
fragmentation and complexity increase instead of 
decreasing. The ‘governance of governance’ or the 
‘coordination of coordination’ thus results in “hy-
percollective action”, i.e. a proliferation of actors, 
policies and structures that is spinning out of con-
trol and produces ever more coordination problems 
(Severino and Ray 2010). As the empirical part of 
the paper will illustrate, hypercollective action in 
global health can be explained as an outcome of 
the interplay between the constraining influence of 
norms on the one hand and the human agency that 
moulds, enacts and transforms the meaning of these 
norms on the other. Hypercollective action then is a 
result of an emerging global normative consensus on 
harmonization coupled with ongoing conflicts over 
the precise scope of such norms and struggles among 
international organizations over their position and 
authority in a reformed global health architecture.
The paper starts with a conceptual clarification of 
what is meant by interorganizational convergence as 
the cooperative and institutionalized variant of rela-
tionships between international organizations. In a 
second step, the paper discusses and critically reviews 
existing theories on inteorganizational convergence 
in terms of their limited ability to grasp convergence 
between multiple international organizations in frag-
mented fields of global governance and the meta-
rules that order and give meaning to relations between 
organizations within an institutional field as a whole. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the paper proposes 
and develops an alternative explanatory approach to 
interorganizational convergence that builds on the 
effects of so-called metagovernance norms which 
define a) good global governance as harmonized 
global governance and b) the ordering principles and 
trajectories according to which such order should 
be generated. In the empirical part of the paper (4.), 
I will analyze the extent to which metagovernance 
norms have had an effect on discourses and prac-
tices of interorganizational convergence, particularly 
between the seven most important multilateral orga-
nizations in contemporary global health governance. 
2. Defining interorganizational convergence
An organization is commonly defined as a purpose-
ful, enduring social structure which is embedded in 
a social environment but can be delineated from it. 
A core proposition from organization sociology that 
this paper adopts is that all social and political or-
ganizations are open systems which interact with 
their organizational environment and are partly 
shaped by it (Katz and Kahn 1978). Relationships 
with other organizational units are a central feature 
of this environment and “in order to understand or-
ganizational behaviour, one must understand how 
the organization relates to other social actors in its 
environment” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 257). As 
organizations, international organizations are by 
analogy embedded in an organizational environ-
ment or field with a social dynamic of rivalry and 
synergy, much like transnational corporations are 
embedded in a global market driven by competi-
tion and joint ventures. Such relations between 
international organizations are fraught with strug-
gles over authority, autonomy and market power. 
On a most basic level, interorganizational relations 
can be defined as any kind of interaction between 
two or more formally independent organizational 
units. The organizational units considered relevant 
for this paper are international organizations as those 
organizations that operate across borders; have a 
permanent administrative structure; have been es-
tablished following an explicit formal agreement 
in which states were involved as principals; and in 
which states or intergovernmental organizations 
occupy a central role (i.e. are at least represented 
in the governing body of the organization). Fol-
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lowing these criteria, interorganizational relations 
considered relevant for this paper encompass not 
only those between classical intergovernmental or-
ganizations (IGOs) such as the WHO or the World 
Bank but also between IGOs and public-private 
organizations in which states and/or IGOs play an 
important role. The paper therefore does not ad-
dress relations between purely private (i.e. civil so-
ciety or business) organizations. The Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (Global 
Fund) and GAVI The Vaccine Alliance (GAVI) are 
considered international organizations here while 
the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative whose 
members are exclusively civil society actors is not. 
To classify the interactions between such interna-
tional organizations as a relationship, they have to 
be more than passing transactions. They must con-
sist of repeated interactions or “patterns of rela-
tions” (Cropper, et al. 2008: 9). The nature of such 
interorganizational relationships between IOs can 
be quite varied: they can be conflictual or coopera-
tive; sporadic or institutionalized; deliberate or un-
intended. As this paper is interested in rapproche-
ment between IOs motivated by international norms 
calling for greater coherence and coordination be-
tween IOs, it logically zooms in on relationships of 
a cooperative, institutionalized and deliberate kind. 
Interorganizational convergence then denotes a pro-
gression in cooperative relationships as it implies an 
intensification of interactions between international 
organizations. It is defined here as an increase in the 
number and depth of deliberate cooperative relation-
ships between two or more formally independent 
organizational units. What follows logically from 
this is a perspective on international organizations 
as purposeful actors that make deliberate choices 
on cooperative relationships with other IOs. While 
they are certainly constrained by external authority 
(member states) there is still room for manoeuvre 
and choice in the behavior of their bureaucracies. 
Cooperative relations with other IOs then are a cho-
sen course of action and not an accidental product. 
 
3. Interorganizational relations: rationalist and 
sociological institutionalist approaches
Since the 1960s, interorganizational relations have 
been a substantial part of scientific inquiry into formal 
organizations in the economy, in politics and in soci-
ety. It was particularly Evan’s seminal contribution 
that helped to establish theory-building on interorgani-
zational relations (Evan 1965). As a consequence, the 
study of interorganizational relations became promi-
nent in Organization Theory and Sociology (Aldrich 
and Pfeffer 1976; Metcalfe 1981); in Management 
Theory and Business Studies (Ebers 2001; Osborn 
and Hagedoorn 1997; Schermerhorn 1975); in Com-
munication Studies (Atouba and Shumate 2010); and 
in Public Administration and Political Science (Hanf 
and O’Toole 1992; O’Toole 1993). The various dis-
ciplinary approaches to interorganizational relations 
that have been developed over time share at least 
three commonalities: first, a dominance of rationalist, 
functionalist approaches that emphasize utiliy-max-
imizing aspects in order to explain why, when and 
in what form organizations forge relationships with 
each other in order to exchange or pool resources. 
Secondly, a narrow empirical focus on dyadic or tri-
adic interorganizational relationships (Wouters and 
De Meesters 2005). And thirdly, a primary interest 
in explaining the determinants of interorganizational 
relationships and the structure of interorganizational 
networks rather than theory-building on the effects 
and outcomes of interorganizational cooperation. All 
of these tendencies add up to an understanding of in-
terorganizational relations as predominatly voluntary 
“strategic alliances” (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) or 
networks between organizations which serve to ex-
change or offer ressources with the goal of securing 
comparative advantages or balancing governance 
deficits without jeopardising the autonomy of indi-
vidual organizations (Atouba and Shumate 2010; Eb-
ers 2001; Goes and Park 1997; Knight and Pye 2004). 
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Interorganizationalism in International Relations 
Scholarship
In the discipline of International Relations (IR), in-
terorganizational relations have attracted widespread 
scholarly interest for considerable time – even if the-
ory and empirical analysis have not employed the 
corresponding terminology. For a long time, schol-
arship has been looking into the emergence and ef-
fects of so-called policy or advocacy networks, ana-
lyzing the networking strategies and relationships 
between primarily non-governmental organizations 
and actors but also between state and non-state enti-
ties (Carpenter 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Keck 
and Sikkink 1999). More recent scientific interest 
in public-private partnerships and networks repre-
senting new or alternative forms of governance can 
also be classified as scholarship on interorganiza-
tional relations (Abbott 2012; Arts 2001; Liese and 
Beisheim 2011; Ruggie 2004). That said,  the really 
new or emerging research program in IR targets rela-
tions among intergovernmental organizations or be-
tween IGOs and newer hybrid public-private global 
organizations (Koch 2012). This finding is hardly 
surprising as, for a long time, specific issue-areas 
or regimes were taken to be dominated by a single 
intergovernmental organization. The rising interest 
in interorganizational relations between intergov-
ernmental organizations therefore runs parallel to 
the real-world overlap between many IOs’ mandates 
resulting from their observable mission creep as 
well as the creation of rival organizations designed 
to remedy governance failure of traditional IGOs. 
The few existing works on causes, forms and ef-
fects of relationships between international organi-
zations in IR so far exhibit the same programmatic 
tendencies as the study of interorganizationalism in 
other disciplines. In their early contributions to in-
terorganizationalism in international politics, both 
Karen Mingst and Christer Jönsson examine the 
relationships between international organizations 
as a rational response to the growing specializa-
tion of international organizations which height-
ens their proclivity to share or pool resources and 
consequently enhances their interdependencies 
(Jönsson 1986; Jönsson 1993; Mingst 1987). In IR 
too, the empirical analysis of interorganizational 
relations has focused on dyadic or triadic relation-
ships (Mingst 1987: World Bank and African De-
velopment Bank; Jönsson 1986: Civil Aeronautics 
Board and International Air Transport Association; 
Koops 2009: NATO and EU; Wouters 2005: EU, 
WHO and WTO) (Wouters and De Meesters 2005) 
and, in analogy to social science research overall, 
these relationships are conceptualized as networks. 
Recently, one can observe a reviving interest in in-
terorganizationalism, following a wave of scholar-
ly work on regime complexes (Alter and Meunier 
2009; Drezner 2007a; Raustiala and Victor 2004) 
understood as nested, overlapping or parallel inter-
national regimes without hiearchical order (Alter 
and Meunier 2009, S. 13). The study of such regime 
complexes accentuates plurality and fragmenta-
tion of rule-systems (and, thus, also of actor land-
scapes) and privileges collisions between different 
rule-systems regulating one and the same issue-area 
or problem (Betts 2010; Drezner 2007b; Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner 2003). By contrast, interorga-
nizationalism turns towards rapprochement and co-
operation between „two or more organizations with 
overlapping geographic and functional domains“ 
(Biermann 2008; Biermann 2011: S. 173; Gehring 
and Faude 2013; Gehring and Oberthür 2009). This 
nascent theoretical and empirical-analytical research 
program has, to date, been dominated by rationalist 
institutional explanatory frameworks that see inter-
organizational relationships as a rational response 
to competition between organizations with over-
lapping mandates. Interorganizational relationships 
then serve to uphold comparative advantages and 
to create functional niches for specialized agencies 
in order to avoid collisions between mandates and 
operations (Gehring and Faude 2013; Gehring and 
Oberthür 2009). To rationalist-institutionalist ap-
proaches it does not come as a surprise that global 
health governance is ripe with such what they see as 
utility-maximizing relationships as health is typically 
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defined as a science-driven, technological, even apo-
litical area of international cooperation with a large 
number of highly specialized international agencies.
3.1 Explaining interorganizational convergence 
in global (health) governance: conventional 
approaches
Cooperative relationships between international or-
ganizations are by no means a new phenomenon in 
global governance. After the WHO was established 
in 1948, one of the first tasks of the WHO Execu-
tive Board was to appoint WHO members for a joint 
UNICEF/WHO committee on health policy (Kick-
busch, Hein and Silberschmidt 2010: 558). Over 
time, however, the frequency and intensity of inter-
actions between staff of international organizations 
have grown to a mindboggling extent. Many of these 
interactions nowaways take place through interor-
ganizational channels for communication and ex-
change such as interorganizational working groups, 
thematic groups, donor forums and expert networks. 
Following functional approaches to interorgani-
zational cooperation, it seems little surprising that 
interorganizational cooperation in global health is 
particularly pervasive. Much of interorganization-
al cooperation in global health governance can be 
neatly explained by core functionalist theories on 
what makes interorganizational cooperation more 
likely. These hypotheses can be clustered in terms 
of where they locate the push and pull factors ex-
plaining interorganizational cooperation: intra-
organizational (rational choice; organization type; 
identity) or extra-organizational (issue-area; outside 
force; culture of cooperation). On the intraorganiza-
tional level, interorganizational theory predicts that 
organizations whose activities are characterized by 
technological specialization and innovation are par-
ticularly open to relations with other organizations 
offering essential ressources and knowledge (Ebers 
2001). Many activities in global health are related 
to the collection and dissemination of scientific evi-
dence and epidemiological data; research & devel-
opment for, procurement and distribution of phar-
maceuticals; and medico-technological progress. 
Functional collaborations between organizations 
that exchange highly specialized knowledge and res-
sources are, thus, at first sight a rational move for 
individual organizations. The exchange and pool-
ing of valuable resources has, indeed, been a major 
motif behind the creation of a sheer endless num-
ber of new initiatives, partnerships and networks in 
global health such as the Medicines for Malaria Ven-
ture or the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 
usually involving resource exchange between state 
actors; non-governmental organizations; philantro-
pies; firms; academic institutions; and think tanks. 
Organization theory also predicts that organizations 
are particularly motivated to start relationships with 
other organizations when they are confronted with re-
source scarcity and performance distress (Schermer-
horn 1975). In fact, resource scarcity is the principal 
driver behind cooperation of IOs, not only with re-
gard to monetary or material resources but particu-
larly in terms of expertise and knowledge. A good 
example for enhanced interorganizational coopera-
tion due to performance distress is the Global Fund. 
When the Global Fund was established in 2002 it 
was designed to be a funding organization only, i.e. 
a highly specialized body. Not long after the Global 
Fund had disbursed the first funds to recipient coun-
tries and even more so when its legitimacy dwindled 
in the aftermath of a number of corruption cases, the 
Global Fund intensified its interorganizational rela-
tionships with organizations that could oversee fund 
applications and implemention on the ground due 
to their technical and logistical expertise, particu-
larly the WHO, UNAIDS and UNDP.8 Over time, 
the Global Fund had also broadened its mandate by 
including the strengthening of health systems over-
all as well as the safeguarding of human rights in its 
missions – which has further boosted its rapproche-
ment with other IOs (Hanefeld 2014). Interorgani-
zational relations were further intensified following 
plans for a thorough reform of the Global Fund fi-
nancing model that sought to extend its role in the 
implementation of grants (GFATM 2011). The same 
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dynamics of performance distress, mandate broad-
ening and increased interorganizational cooperation 
characterize the history of GAVI (Grundy 2010: 194). 
In terms of the intra-organizational qualities that 
make cooperation between organizations more 
likely, organization theory also predicts that per-
meable organizations are more prone to open up 
to collaboration with other organizations (bound-
ary permeability hypothesis) (Schermerhorn 1975: 
851). In global health, it has been particularly the 
opening up of the World Health Organization to-
wards non-state actors that was a major catalyst 
for ever more interorganizational relations and 
networks. The constitutional mandate of most IOs 
that were set up in global health after 1990 such 
as UNAIDS or the Global Fund calls for enhanced 
access and collaboration with other organizations 
(particularly non-govermental) and the history of 
these institutions shows high boundary permeabil-
ity towards other public and private organizations. 
The literature on interorganizational relations has 
also identified important extra-organizational factors 
explaining why organizations cooperate with each 
other. Here, the main hypothesis is that interorgani-
zational cooperation is more likely to happen when a 
powerful extraorganizational force pushes organiza-
tions towards cooperation. So, for example, a more 
coordinated international response to the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic began to take shape after UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 2177 (2014) was adopted unanimous-
ly and followed by the establishment of the United 
Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response 
(UNMEER). Likewise, a policy shift towards health 
systems strengthening (HSS) and harmonization in 
U.S. policy on global health following the establish-
ment of the Global Health Initiative by the Obama 
Adminstration spurred increasing cooperation be-
tween US health agencies and programs and other 
international health actors (US Government 2011)– 
the U.S. being the most powerful principal in inter-
national organizations dealing with health issues.9 
3.2 The limitations of rationalist institutionalist 
interorganizationalism
All of the hypotheses discussed above help to ex-
plain why global health governance is replete with 
interorganizational interactions and why collabo-
rations between organizations are seen as advan-
tageous for the actors involved. However, with 
regard to the study of interorganizational relation-
ships between IOs, traditional functionalist ratio-
nalist approaches to interorganizationalism exhibit 
a number of shortcomings. The history of interna-
tional organizations shows, for example, that re-
source constraints and performance distress have 
been a constant challenge to IOs – there is, thus, 
little explanatory power that can be gained from 
these two independent variables. More importantly 
still, existing theories on interorganizationalism 
treat individual relationships as isolated cases and 
therefore fail to address the systemic effects of indi-
vidual relationships between two and more organi-
zational units. While individual collaborations can 
be highly beneficial to the organizations involved, 
they do also impact on the organizational field as a 
whole and not necessarily in the intended way. If 
international organizations are open systems inter-
acting with their organizational environment then 
cooperative relationships between two or more or-
ganizations in that environment not only affect the 
cooperating units but also the organizational field, 
shifting power relationship, pulling more actors 
into the cooperative arrangement or triggering off 
new competitive dynamics with other networks. 
There is, in fact, very strong evidence from global 
health governance that cooperation with other or-
ganizations has been a rational move benefiting the 
collaborating actors but impacting negatively on the 
policy field overall. The catchy finding of hypercol-
lective action in global health points to the limita-
tions of rationalist approaches to interorganizational 
relations, inasmuch as it testifies to the unintended 
consequences of initiatives and instruments aimed 
at interorganizational synchronization but adding 
rather than reducing complexity. A case in point for 
this dynamic is UNAIDS which has grown from a 
coordination mechanism for all UN bodies work-
ing on HIV/AIDS into a full-blown bureaucracy, 
developing a mission creep that eventually turned 
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its role upside down, from coordinator to competitor 
with other agencies (Shridar 2012). Likewise, one 
of the most acclaimed initiatives working towards 
harmonization between the actions of multiple inter-
national organizations in health – the International 
Health Partnership+ (IHP+) – has been found to fail 
in its ambitious harmonization goals (Conway, et al. 
2008; see also Holzscheiter 2011). Thus, while in-
terorganizational cooperation yields benefits for the 
interacting organizational units, it may undermine 
rather than strengthen collectively shared goals in-
cluding orderly global governance. When it comes to 
explaining these aggregate effects of interorganiza-
tional cooperation, rationalist institutional approach-
es reach their limits. Interorganizational cooperation 
may be a rational move for the actors in the short-run, 
but the long-term transaction costs associated with 
hypercollective action call for exploring alterna-
tive drivers behind interorganizational convergence. 
3.3. A new theory on interorganizationalism: 
norms, interorganizational convergence and 
global institutional order
The unintended or irrational systemic effects of in-
terorganizational cooperation described above repre-
sent a severe challenge to rationalist-institutionalist 
approaches to interorganizationalism. Opening up 
the theoretical spectrum to sociological, norm-
focused theories on interorganizational relations, 
however, helps explaining hypercollective action in 
global health and to understand the systemic ramifi-
cations of interorganizational convergence as a prod-
uct of emerging yet contested global norms. In fact, 
some of the earliest approaches to interorganization-
alism in organization theory already included norms 
as independent variables explaining cooperation be-
tween organizations. Thus, organization theory sees 
interorganizational cooperation as an outcome of 
norms that foster a “culture of cooperation” among 
organizations where “cooperation per se takes on a 
positive value” (Schermerhorn 1975: 848). These 
norms may either be endogenous to the organiza-
tion – i.e. the organization’s identity as a coopera-
tive organization (Schermerhorn 1975: 852) – or 
influence organizations exogenously – i.e. a shared 
culture among organizations with similar identities 
that defines interorganizational cooperation as good 
organizational behaviour in the face of a collectively 
desired outcome. From such a perspective, interna-
tional organizations are more than utility-maximing 
agencies seeking to forge relationships with other 
organizations in order to reduce transaction costs 
and maximize their gains. Instead, IOs are converg-
ing because they are responding to norms as stan-
dards of appropriate behaviour which define good 
global governance as coherent and synchronized 
global governance. IOs drift towards each other be-
cause they acknowledge the value of a specific so-
cial order in the governance of global health matters. 
A sociological institutionalist theory on interorga-
nizationalism posits that organizations are always 
embedded in an organizational field understood as 
the totality of actors and organizations that operate 
within a specific sphere of activity and are char-
acterized by similar organizational structures and 
processes (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009). Norms 
and rules are an essential component of such orga-
nizational fields. As the virtual form of institutions, 
these ground rules enable social interaction be-
tween international organizations. They are there-
fore constitutive of a shared identity among orga-
nizations in the same field (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March and Olsen 
1989; Martin and Simmons 1998; Meyer and Rowan 
1977). What follows from this is that the boundar-
ies between individual organizations’ interests and 
motivations can no longer be neatly drawn – rath-
er, organizations collectively form a social field in 
which their actions are oriented towards intersubjec-
tively shared standards for (appropriate) behaviour. 
To see interorganizational convergence in global 
health governance as driven by norms on appro-
priate organizational behaviour in the face of frag-
mentation allows moving away from a portrayal of 
global health as an apolitical, technical domain and 
stressing its political and ideological dimensions. 
Applying such a sociological institutionalist theory 
on interorganizational convergence to global health 
governance permits to highlight two things: first, it 
understands convergence as an effect of a powerful 
normative discourse in which institutional fragmen-
tation is equated with inefficiency and irrationality 
while harmonization, coordination, coherence and 
division of labor are seen as healthy metagover-
nance principles for a more ordered rational health 
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architecture. And secondly, it opens up a new av-
enue for explaining the unintended consequences 
of convergence by looking at potentially diverging 
interpretations of these metagovernance principles 
in the discourses and actions of different interna-
tional actors. The link between these two explana-
tory endeavours of the paper lies in balancing the 
power of a normative discourse on good global 
governance (power of discourse) with the power of 
international organizations to shape this discourse 
(power in discourse) Holzscheiter 2005; Holzs-
cheiter 2010). International organizations are both 
constrained by the logic of appropriateness of norms 
and rules of the organizational field in which they 
are embedded and, at the same time, actively en-
gaged in a meaning-struggle that shapes, contextu-
alizes and enacts these normsin which these norms 
are shaped, contextualized and enacted (Krook and 
True 2012; Wiener 2009; Zwingel 2012). They are 
guided but not determined by norms – and they stra-
tegically engage in discourses about norms in order 
to influence the rules of their organizational field. 
As the empirical part of the paper will illustrate, 
hypercollective action in global health can be ex-
plained as an outcome of the interplay between the 
constraining influence of norms on the one hand and 
the human agency that moulds the meaning of these 
norms on the other. Hypercollective action then is 
a result of an emerging global normative consensus 
on convergence coupled with ongoing conflicts over 
the precise scope of such norms and how to trans-
late them into practice. As more and more actors are 
drawn into the logic of appropriateness of interor-
ganizational coordination, they strive to act as norm 
entrepreneus and be the ‘linking pin’ (Jönsson 1986; 
Mingst 1987: 282; Whetten 1981) at the centre of 
the projected global governance architecture in order 
to retain authority and competence within the policy 
field. Ultimately, a norm-focused theory on interor-
ganizationalism then rejects the dichotomous vision 
of interorganizational relations as either conflict-
ridden or cooperative. As international organizations 
converge and seek to shape the rules that govern their 
cooperative relationships, their identity and their col-
lective goals, new space opens up for conflicts over 
the norms and rules that define good interorganiza-
tional relationships and the larger institutional order 
towards which they should be oriented. International 
debates on the principles that should regulate these 
relationships between IOs then reflect their potential-
ly conflicting visions on identities, responsibilities 
and authority of themselves and others within the or-
ganizational field of health governance. As scholars 
working on norms remind us, in many cases in which 
norms influence behaviour that behaviour shows 
the „conflictive impact of divergent interpretations 
of norms“ rather than the unambiguous meaning of 
standards for appropriate behaviour (Wiener 2009). 
Metagovernance norms and principles are not only 
constitutive for individual IOs but they are also or-
dering principles oriented towards a specific insti-
tutional order, as they ascribe identities and define 
what is seen as good global governance. Norma-
tive contestation surrounding such emerging norms 
therefore reflects different ideas about institutional 
order in global governance. From the standpoint of 
a sociological institutional theory on interorganiza-
tionalism, an intensification of interorganizational 
relations is then no longer a logical answer to institu-
tional fragmentation, but rather an outcome of a spe-
cific „organizational discourse“ (Hardy and Phillips 
1998; Lotia and Hardy 2008; Phillips, et al. 2000) 
that stipulates when and how international organiza-
tions should converge to absorb the negative rami-
fications of fragmentation. To view contemporary 
convergence between IOs as embedded in a power-
ful normative discourse permits to expose the thruth 
claims that underlie organizational behaviour and to 
point to alternative discourses and courses of action.
The empirical analysis below evidences an over-
whelming normative consensus on the undesirabil-
ity of further fragmentation in global health and the 
desirability for more order. At the same time, look-
ing at individual organizations’ viewpoints on the 
appropriate “organizing principles” (Wiener 2007) 
for such a new global health architecture, it is more 
than evident that there is a fierce struggle for inter-
pretive authority over this new global health order. 
In the following, I will provide empirical evidence 
for the two core propositions that this paper advanc-
es: first, that emerging norms of metagovernance 
are a powerful driver behind interorganizational 
convergence in global health governance and sec-
ondly, that the practice of interorganizational con-
vergence exhibits differing visions on the ordering 
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principles along which the relations between inter-
national organizations with overlapping mandates 
and missions should be arrayed. In combination, 
these two propositions can explain why interorga-
nizational cooperation has so far resulted in hyper-
collective action rather than reducing fragmentation 
and strengthening the global health architecture. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will analyze dynam-
ics of interorganizational cooperation in global health 
with the aim of showing how metagovernance have 
shaped the relations between global health agencies, 
drawing especially on evidence from densely popu-
lated fields such as HIV/AIDS. The analysis focuses 
on two things: 1.) to provide evidence supporting a 
powerful discursive formation that equates fragmen-
tation with ineffectiveness and convergence with ef-
fective order and 2.) to demonstrate that while the 
normative belief in more architecture and enhanced 
interorganizational convergence is shared by all ma-
jor international organizations in health, individual 
organizations’ policies and internal debates reveal a 
lively and contentious debate over the trajectories of 
(goals) and organization principles (processes) for 
convergence. This meaning-struggle is quintessential 
for a continued conflict among international organiza-
tions over power, identity and leadership in the glob-
al health architecture. Thus, rather than projecting 
my own vision of a good global health order I want 
to pinpoint the contested nature of institutional order 
in global health. To this end, the following empiri-
cal part highlights effects of global metagovernance 
norms on three levels: 1. By analyzing discourses on 
institutional order in global health, 2. By analyzing 
practices as the response of individual international 
organizations to metagovernance norms and 3. By 
looking at the outcome of these practices, i.e. do the 
practices result in the desired collective outcome.
4. Metagovernance norms and contested order-
ing principles in global health
The global discourse on interorganizational coordi-
nation as a cure for costly fragmentation revolves 
around a particular type of norms that will be called 
metagovernance norms in this paper. Metagover-
nance norms are about the “governance of gover-
nance” (Torfing, et al. 2012: 4); they constitute “the 
ground rules for governance and the regulatory order 
in and through which governance partners can pur-
sue their aims” (Jessop 2004: 65) and they target the 
“complex process through which a plurality of social 
and political actors with diverging interests interact 
[…] deploying a range of ideas, rules and resourc-
es” (Torfing, Peters, Pierre and Sørensen 2012: 2). 
A metagovernance norm is a broad statement about 
appropriave behaviour in a given situation and within 
a shared identity (i.e. a social norm), such as when 
interorganizational coordination or harmonization is 
seen as the appropriate response to perceived costly 
institutional fragmentation. Thus, we might speak of 
a global harmonization norm lying at the heart of at-
tempts to restore institutional order in global health 
governance. Metagovernance principles in turn 
fill this norm with meaning and define appropriate 
courses of action through which harmonization can 
be achieved. In the discourse on interorganizational 
convergence in fragmented fields of global gover-
nance two such global metagovernance principles can 
be identified: coherence and division of labour. These 
metagovernance principles refer to different variants 
of harmonization: coherence emphasizes likeness of 
units in a system. It therefore implies congruence be-
tween the policies, instruments, actions and goals of 
organizations. Harmonization as division of labor, by 
contrast, emphasizes difference between the units in 
a system and tries to compose them in such a way 
that they build a differentiated but harmonious whole. 
The principles and strategies through which interna-
tional organizations enact the harmonization norm 
are therefore consequential in terms of how poten-
tial collisions between mandates of individual IOs 
are governed: where harmonization is understood 
as a streamlining of organizational policies and 
actions, mandate overlap is accepted and author-
ity shared in the name of “complementary official 
goals” (Schermerhorn 1975: 851), i.e. when differ-
ent IOs seek to harmonize gender components in 
their organizational policies and actions in order to 
achieve broad social and political change. Mandate 
overlap is accepted but autonomy intact. By contrast, 
where harmonization is understood as a division of 
labour based on an assessment of ‘comparative ad-
vantages’, mandate overlap is avoided alltogether 
and authority is divided rather than shared. This 
means an increase in issue- or function-specific au-
thority but also a loss of overall autonomy and an 
increase in interdependence between organiza-
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tions. It follows from this that division of labor be-
tween IOs in the name of harmonization is a much 
more challenging principle of metagovernance. 
The various principles that can be accommodated by 
the harmonization norm are given further concretiza-
tion and meaning in the strategies through which in-
ternational organizations translate them into practice 
– the trajectories of harmonization. To give an exam-
ple: there are different strategies to enact the princi-
ple of coherence. On the one hand, two or more inter-
national organizations can reach a mutual agreement 
on new standards, such as the WHO Code of Conduct 
on Recruitment of Health Personnel adopted by the 
World Health Assembly in 2010 – a new standard 
aiming to recude fragmentation between too many 
regional and voluntary codes in this area (Taylor and 
Dhillon 2011). On the other hand, IOs can work to-
wards coherence by transferring and/or adopting al-
ready established standards to different issues. This 
happened, for example, when the Three Ones Princi-
ples developed by UNAIDS in coordination with the 
World Bank and the Global Fund to harmonize inter-
national actors’ policies and actions in national AIDS 
responses 10 were transferred to Malaria control. In 
the first case, harmonization and order is created 
through negotiated order (Peters and Pierre 2004: 
81), i.e. horizontal processes of negotiating common 
standards and procedures. In the second case order 
is created through centralization, i.e. by acknowl-
edging the authority and leadership of one or several 
key actors for a specific field or a specific function. 
 
Table 1: Metagovernance principles and trajectories
PRINCIPLES
TRAJECTORIES 
Coherence Division of labor 
Negotiated Order Negotiation of new standards for 
harmonization (e.g. WHO Code of 
Conduct on Recruitment of Health 
Personnel)  
Dyadic or triadic agreements on 
problem- or function specific division 
of labor (e.g. Memorandum of 
Understanding between two or more 
IOs)
Centralization Transfer of already existing 
standards to different issues/by 
different actors (e.g. Transfer of 
Three Ones Principles to Malaria 
Control) 
Leadership role for one or several IOs 
for the policy field overall (e.g. reform 
of overall global health architecture 
independently of problem)
In the following, I will discuss how meagovernance 
norms, principles and trajectories have figured in 
the international debate on restoring order in global 
health governance.  
4.1. Divided in Harmony – Uncontested Harmoni-
zation Norm, Contested Organizing Principles for 
Global Health
Analyzing the contemporary debate on restoring ar-
chitecture in global health reveals a very powerful 
truth claim with regard to interorganizational coop-
eration: interorganizational convergence is almost 
without exception framed as the rational answer to in-
stitutional complexity and potentially colliding rule-
systems and governance structures. There is a star-
tling unanimity among scholars, policy experts and 
practitioners in global health that a new international 
health order and a re-organization of relationships 
between IOs is the pathway towards more effective 
and efficient attainment of collective goals such as 
the control and prevention of major infectious diseas-
es (Buse and Walt 1996; Kickbusch, Hein and Silber-
schmidt 2010; Rugg, et al. 2004; Spicer, et al. 2010). 
These unanimous calls for greater harmonization and 
unity in global health governance result from the ver-
dict that the current institutional order in this field 
is not tailored to the global public goods it seeks to 
provide and lacks both legitimacy and effectiveness 
(Aldasoro, et al. 2010; Balogun 2005; Birdsall 2004). 
And in most cases, claims in favour of harmoniza-
tion are connected to an international agreement, the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD), 
which includes 
harmonization in 
its five principles 
for better for-
eign aid stipulat-









tion was signed 
23
ces papers - open forum # 13
by 90 countries (industrialized and developing), 
the major international financial institutions and 
around 25 multilateral organizations, among them 
the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). 
It was followed in 2008 by the Accra Agenda for 
Action in which developing and donor countries 
were outlining necessary steps for implementa-
tion of the PD such as “Building more effective 
and inclusive partnerships for development”.11 
The PD represents the first formalized attempt to 
turn ,,aid effectiveness concepts [...] into global com-
mitments for donor agencies“ (Beloe 2005: 15), in-
asmuch as it enshrines tangible global goals for in-
terorganizational cooperation in development. The 
five core principles of the PD – harmonization, align-
ment, ownership, managing for results, and mutual 
accountability – are meant to serve as the normative 
basis for good development cooperation.12  The PD 
demands, for example, that 50 per cent of all techni-
cal assistance should be implemented through coor-
dinated programs that are oriented towards national 
development strategies (OECD 2005/2008: 9). In 
sum, the adoption of the PD is a significant stept to-
wards an institutionalization of relationships between 
international (donor) organizations and the collec-
tive management of development programs. Even 
though the PD is not a health-specific international 
agreement, it repeatedly singles out areas in which an 
improvement of aid effectiveness seems warranted – 
among them HIV/AIDS – and the health sector has 
been used as a so-called ‘tracer sector’ in order to 
evaluate the effects of the Paris Principles (Dickin-
son 2011; OECD 2011b). As a consequence, the PD 
has broadly resonated in global health governance 
and inspired a broad range of health-specific initia-
tives towards interorganizational harmonization.
The Uncontested Harmonization Norm
An analysis of policy documentation of the seven 
major international organizations in health (WHO, 
World Bank, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, Global 
Fund and GAVI) produces the remarkable finding 
that the appropriateness of re-establishing institu-
tional order by strengthening norms that outline in-
dividual responsibilities and competencies of actors 
with overlapping mandates seems largely uncon-
tested (Holzscheiter 2015). This finding points to a 
strong desire for centralization and order among all 
agencies involved in global health governance. In 
the first place, cooperative relationships between in-
ternational health agencies, thus, are defined as the 
appropriate response to excessive fragmentation 
(norm) – which points to the marked influence of the 
harmonization norm on intra- and interorganization-
al discourse. However, as this basic harmonization 
norm is substantiated and filled with meaning, one 
can identify contestation over both the trajectories of 
harmonization as well as the organizing principles 
through which harmonization should occur. While 
the unanimity with regards to the necessity for more 
interorganizational harmonization points to a power-
ful belief in a more rational global health order and a 
strong delegitimization of the status quo, the ongoing 
meaning-struggle revolving around principles and 
trajectories for establishing such order reveals con-
flicting visions of a good global health architecture. 
Following the Paris Declaration, good global gov-
ernance as ordered global governance most broadly 
implies clearly defined roles and expectations for 
all actors involved in a policy field, ideally resulting 
in a division of labor that helps to avoid duplication 
and over-fragmentation of interventions, programs 
and institutional structures. One of the causal beliefs 
underlying the Paris Declaration is that “excessive 
fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level 
impairs aid effectiveness” (OECD 2005/2008: 6) and 
that enhanced coordination on all of these levels is 
key to effective aid policies. While the five princi-
ples of the PD cover all interactions in development 
cooperation at the global, national and local level, 
it is the principle of harmonization that specifically 
captures relationships between IOs. According to the 
PD, harmonization presupposes that donor organiza-
tions “make full use of their respective comparative 
advantage at sector or country level, by delegating, 
where appropriate authority to lead donors for the ex-
ecution of programmes, activities and tasks” (OECD 
2005/2008: 6). Four areas are singled out as partic-
ularly indicative for harmonization of international 
actors: 1.) capacity-building through the coordina-
tion of technical assistance, 2.) „common arrange-
ments and procedures“, 3.) „joint missions“ and 4.) 
„joint country analytical work“ (OECD 2011a: 19).
 
In the following sections, I will empirically focus 
on the international response to AIDS as this field 
is generally seen as acutely fragmented and inter-
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The Three Ones Principles thus represent a syn-
thesis of different levels of coordination: har-
monization (coordination between donor insti-
tutions), alingment (streamlining donor actions 
according to national priorities and into health 
systems) and ownership (leadership of national 
governments in all these coordination activities). 
Since 2005, the PD and the Three Ones Principles 
have been implemented through a series of strate-
gies and instruments geared towards the fortification 
of interorganizational convergence, spearheaded by 
the Global Fund, the World Bank and the UN fam-
ily. There is no major international organization in 
health that has not responded to the Paris Principles 
by incorporating them into their organizational phi-
losophy and strategies, guided by the principles of 
coherence and divisions of labor.14  Since 2007, 
the Global Fund has been reviewing its policies 
in terms of aid effectiveness and the Paris Dec-
laration to which it is a signatory (GFATM 2009). 
What is more, the PD framework for aid effective-
ness has led to the creation of new institutional-
ized forums for interorganizational harmonization 
such as International Health Partnership + and the 
H4+ (Working Together for Women’s and Chil-
dren’s Health). These forums are no legal entities in 
themselves, but co-hosted by a number of interna-
tional organization whose staff cooperates in time-
limited expert and working groups.15 The IHP+ 
for example is co-facilitated by the WHO and the 
World Bank with the mission to “enhance aid ef-
fectiveness […] through effective collaboration 
and coordination of various partnerships and ini-
tiatives” (WHO/World Health Assembly 2010: 2).
One of the most important instruments towards 
achieving a harmonized institutional architecture for 
AIDS was the temporary establishment of the Global 
Task Team on Improving AIDS Coordination among 
Multilateral Institutions and International Donors 
(GTT). The GTT, a team of experts composed of 
representatives from 24 countries and institutions, 
met for a limited time during the year 2005 in or-
der to make recommendations on „options for fur-
ther coordination, particularly within the multilat-
eral system, to resolve areas of duplication and gap 
in the global response to AIDS” (UNAIDS 2005a). 
organizational relations as conflictual. Apart from 
institutional complexity, HIV/AIDS exemplifies the 
challenges of global health governance in the 21st 
century like no other health issue. Ever since the PD 
and the Accra Agenda for Action have been adopted, 
the relationship managament between international 
organizations has been regularly assessed quantita-
tively and qualitatively both through the OECD itself 
as well as through other important actors such as the 
Center for Global Development in Washington DC or 
the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assess-
ment Network (MOPAN).13  The following empirical 
discussion of meaning-struggles revolving around 
the harmonization norm uses the results of these 
analyses as background information. It draws its pri-
mary data for analysis from core policy-documents 
and working papers in which the four most important 
international organizations in the field of HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS, Weltbank, Global Fund und WHO) out-
line their individual or collective perspective on in-
terorganizational coherence and coordination (before 
all: GFATM 2005; GFATM, et al. 2006; GFATM and 
World Bank HIV/AIDS Program 2006; OECD 2011b; 
Shakow 2006; UNAIDS 2005b; UNAIDS 2008; UN-
AIDS 2011; WHO 2009; World Bank 2008). The 
empirical insights are meant to exhibit the power of 
the global harmonization norm on the hand and the 
meaning-struggle surrounding its enactment in the 
concrete policies and practices of IOs on the other. 
Translating the harmonization norm into interorga-
nizational cooperation – Contested trajectories and 
ordering principles
Since its adoption, the Paris Declaration has inspired 
a broad range of initiatives for the strengthening of 
interorganizational relations in development coop-
eration and the collective „management for results“. 
It has, therefore, served as a catalyst for interorgani-
zational convergence, leading to the institutionaliza-
tion of old and new interorganizational relations. In 
the global response to AIDS, for example, the draft-
ing of the Paris Principles has co-evolved with the 
adoption of the AIDS-specific Three Ones Principles 
that call for harmonization among multilateral and 
bilateral donors along One National AIDS Strategy; 
One National Monitoring & Evaluation System; 
and One National AIDS Authority (UNAIDS 2004). 
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After completing its review of the harmonizing ac-
tions of multilateral health organizations it issued a 
number of very specific recommendations on how to 
improve effectiveness in the global AIDS response 
such as a “clarification of the division of labour 
among multilateral organizations” or the “harmo-
nization of programming, financing and reporting” 
(UNAIDS 2005a: 6). These recommendations, in 
turn, prompted bilateral and multilateral consulta-
tions as well as a series of dyadic and triadic coop-
eration agreements between IOs (see for example 
GFATM, PEPFAR and Bank 2006; UNAIDS 2008). 
All major international organizations involved in 
global health governance reacted to these recom-
mendations, by publishing reports and statements in 
which they laid down their interpretation of interor-
ganizational harmonization, how they understood the 
roles of individual actors in a larger health architec-
ture and their own position therein (see for example 
GFATM and World Bank HIV/AIDS Program 2006; 
PEPFAR 2007; UNAIDS 2005b; UNAIDS 2008). 
As a consequence of the recommendations of the 
Global Task Team, global strategies and instruments 
for harmonization between international organiza-
tions multiplied. The World Bank and Global Fund 
commissioned a joint study on their comparative ad-
vantages which resulted in the recommendation that 
the „Global Fund should focus on AIDS prevention 
and on the procurement of the commodities and drugs 
essential for treatment, and should not include health 
system strengthening” while the World Bank should 
take a lead role in health systems strengthening (Sha-
kow 2006: 8). UNAIDS and the Global Fund signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding in 2008 in which 
they defined shared goals and complementary roles 
geared towards strengthening the global response to 
AIDS (UNAIDS 2008). In this MoU, the two agen-
cies agree on a division of labor in which UNAIDS 
provides technical support for countries applying for 
Global Fund funding.16  While these policies do not 
represent binding treaties between the different IOs 
they nevertheless exemplify a move towards more 
institutionalized forms of interorganizational coop-
eration and, thus, interorganizational convergence 
at the global level. UNAIDS and the World Bank 
responded to the GTT recommendation by creating 
and testing a Country Harmonization and Alignment 
Tool (CHAT), a tool designed to assist national AIDS 
coordination authorities to “assess the harmonization 
and alignment among HIV international partners”.17 
 
The analysis of IOs’ response to the Paris Declaration 
allows two important conclusions: on the one hand, 
all major IOs in health subscribe to the demands of 
the Paris Declaration and have changed their organi-
zational policies and practices accordingly. Thus, the 
PD has become the central normative reference point 
in the global debate how to gear interorganizational 
relations towards a fundamental reform of the global 
health architecture. This finding validates the pre-
scriptive character of the PD’s ‘harmonization norm’ 
and shows that it pulls more and more actors into its 
logic of appropriateness. In their strategies and vi-
sions for effective global health governance, all major 
health IOs value coordination and coherence between 
international organizations as the central building 
block of more legitimate and effecitve global gover-
nance (see for example European Commission 2013; 
GFATM 2010; PEPFAR 2007; UNAIDS 2006). The 
causal belief interorganizational harmonization = ef-
fectiveness can be found as an unchallenged mantra 
in the policy documentation analyzed (see for exam-
ple WHO 2009). Effectiveness, in turn, is consistent-
ly equated with “making the money work” (efficient 
spending) (UNAIDS 2006; World Bank 2008, S. 47) 
and the strengthening of national plans, strategies 
and governance structures. What is more, calls for 
more or better harmonization between international 
organizations in health are always connected with a 
vision of the position of individual organizations in 
the larger governance architecture. Unsurprisingly, 
all four major IOs working in the field of HIV/AIDS 
use the debate on interorganizational harmonization 
as a vehicle to promote their „linking pin“ position 
in the field (Jönsson 1986; Mingst 1987: 282). This 
leadership status is either justified by their experi-
ence and knowledge in the field or because they 
see themselves as a catalyst of interorganizational 
cooperation and partnership (see for example UN-
AIDS 2010: 12; WHO 2009; World Bank 2008: 52). 
Even though the desideratum of restoring order 
through stronger coherence and division of labor 
between IOs is shared by all organizations at the 
discursive level, the  translation of the harmoniza-
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tion norm into organizational policies, strategies and 
practices of relationship management exhibits in-
congruent visions of the principles and trajectories 
through which such order should be restored – first 
and foremost exemplified by the meaning-struggle 
surrounding the empty signifier ‘harmonization’. 
This meaning-struggle exposes contestation revolv-
ing around the trajectories for such order (central-
ization vs. negotiated order) on the one hand and 
around the two harmonization principles of coher-
ence and division of labor on the other. As the above 
examples from the field of HIV/AIDS have shown 
most harmonization activities so far follow the tra-
jectory of negotiated order which is either problem-
specific or related to a specific function (funding; 
monitoring; procurement and supply). Thus, prob-
lem- or function-specific divisions of labor or coher-
ence strategies have been negotiated among a small 
number of IOs following the principles of the PD. 
These harmonization efforts have targeted problem-
or function-specific harmonization of rules and sys-
tems for monitoring and evaluation; harmonization 
of procurement policies and procedures; harmoni-
zation of financing mechanisms and the pooling of 
finances and resources; the exchange and transfer 
of knowledge and resources between organizations. 
There are, however, alternative visions on global 
health architecture that see centralization as a nec-
essary trajectory for harmonization. In the contem-
porary debate on better global health governance, a 
number of proposals for restoring order are discussed 
which are based on the return to a central harmoniz-
ing authority for health. All of these revolve around 
the question of the position of the WHO in contem-
porary global health governance and of which in-
stitution would enjoy the greatest legitimacy as an 
overall global health coordinator. At the heart of this 
debate lies, logically, the question of how to enhance 
the authority of the WHO as a central coordinating 
entity in global health. Different ideas circulate in the 
debate on WHO’s role in global health governance 
on how it may once more become the centerpiece 
of this architecture. A number of influential health 
experts have argued that the WHO is still the only 
health organization with democratic and formal le-
gal legitimacy and, as such, the logical candidate for 
a global health coordinator (Kickbusch, Hein and 
Silberschmidt 2010). They suggest that the estab-
lishment of a so-called Committee C at the World 
Health Assembly could restore its central authority 
in GHG and therefore mitigate fragmentation, inas-
much as the WHO would be mandated to develop 
the rules of the game for health agencies and their 
interactions. A Committee C of the World Health As-
sembly, it is suggested, would ensure a broad demo-
cratic foundation for these rules while, at the same 
time, making the WHO a “suprastructural node” in 
today’s complex networked governance. Thus, the 
WHO is envisioned as a metagovernance institu-
tion that negotiates and represents the norms and 
principles for good interorganizational cooperation 
in health (Kickbusch, Hein and Silberschmidt 2010: 
560). Apart from these proposals for reforming the 
WHO by introducing a new Committee C there have 
also been suggestions for different “superstructural 
nodes” such as the establishment of a UN Glob-
al Health Panel that would coordinate initiatives 
within the UN as well as their relationships with 
external stakeholders (Hein 2013; Sridhar 2013). 
While such a trajectory of centralization aims at 
maximal coherence between a multitude of actors 
and rule-systems in global health governance, there 
are also proposals in the other direction, i.e. central-
ization in terms of a function-specific division of 
labor between the major IOs active in health. This 
proposal for a reform of the global health landscape 
towards more order and architecture promotes the 
clear separation of spheres of authority between 
different IOs based on an assessment of their com-
parative advantages (UNAIDS Lancet Commission 
2013). Order, thus, is established through the cre-
ation of a limited number of centers in the health 
architecture. In this vein, there is an ongoing discus-
sion on the future of UNAIDS which, in times of 
shifting global health priorities and ‘AIDS fatigue’ 
is seen as a candidate for a UN-wide health coor-
dination agency. Likewise, the harmonization norm 
has also been translated into specific broad divisions 
of labor at the global level. In late 2014, the Glob-
al Fund and the WHO signed a partnership agree-
ment in which they agreed on a division of labor in 
the field where WHO would provide technical as-
sistance to countries applying for GF funding. The 
Global Fund is also currently seeking to formalized 
its relationships with other UN organizations such as 
UNAIDS and UNICEF.18  This interorganizational 
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convergence is a clear sign of a re-acknowledgment 
of WHO’s authority in global health governance 
while at the same time showing how different IOs 
(WHO, GAVI, Global Fund) seek to negotiate the 
lines of division between their spheres of authority. 
 
The different trajectories for harmonization that 
have emerged in the contemporary debate on a good 
global health order evidence disagreement over 
how strongly institutionalized interorganizational 
relationships in health should be and how authority 
should be divided or shared between IOs. This dis-
agreement also finds its expression in the astonish-
ing variety of terms that are used synonymously with 
harmonization. In the policy documents analyzed for 
this paper, harmonization is used interchangeably 
with the following terms: mutual support; partner-
ship; collaboration; division of labor; collective ef-
forts; coherence; comparative advantages; coopera-
tion; multiple accountabilities; shared responsibility 
(GFATM 2004); positive synergies, or simply con-
sultation. A widely-noted lengthy report by the WHO 
Maximizing Positive Synergies Academic Consor-
tium, for example, refers to ‚donor coordination‘ 149 
times but never specifies what coordination implies 
(WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Academic 
Consortium 2009). The way in which the harmoniza-
tion norm is filled with meaning confounds different 
degrees of collaboration that range from occasional 
consultation to far-reaching coordination in terms 
of programmatic coherence and division of labor. 
When the OECD reviewed the implementation pro-
cess of the Paris Declaration in 2007, it concluded 
that there are „very different views emerged on what 
should count as co-ordination“ (OECD 2007: 23). 
4.2. Translating harmonization principles on the 
ground – normative ambiguity and best practices
The above discussion has made it obvious that the in-
ternational debate surrounding a ‘master-design’ for 
global health governance is based on strong consen-
sus on the inadequacy of the status quo and the desir-
ability of more order and structure. There has been an 
observable shift in the discourse on good global gov-
ernance, from valuing networked global governance, 
innovation and pluralization to renewed concern for 
the effects of excessive institutional fragmentation. 
The paper has sought to show that global metagov-
ernance norms such as the PD and sector- or issue-
specific norms have had a multiplying effect with re-
gard to interorganizational initiatives responding to 
fragmentation. This normative shift has taken place 
alongside other shifts in the global health agenda, 
most importantly the contemporary trend away from 
prioritising specific diseases to strengthening health 
systems (HSS) overall. As all major global health 
actors venture into HSS the necessity for harmoni-
zation of bilateral and multilateral actors in nation-
al health systems is perceived to be even stronger. 
Despite this consensus, though, policies and prac-
tices of interorganizational convergence have so far 
added very little to restoring architecture on the glob-
al level due to conflicting visions of such a global 
health order and the position of individual organiza-
tions within that order. As insights from domestic 
health systems in developing countries show, inter-
organizational cooperation on the ground reveals the 
normative discrepancies and frictions inherent to the 
global discourse on metagovernance norms which 
also have concrete effects on practices of interorga-
nizational cooperation on the ground. These practic-
es exhibit the numerous translation problems of good 
governance norms wherever they relate to the del-
egation of tasks and responsibilities to national and 
sub-national political units and the fundamental con-
testation of such norms by some actors (Beloe 2005; 
Sundewall, et al. 2009; Sundewall 2009). Most fun-
damentally, evidence from domestic health systems 
confirms that global efforts towards re-establishing 
institutional order in fragmented governance land-
scapes through divisions of labor and the distribu-
tion of competencies are at odds with simultaneous 
processes through which coordination in multi-level 
governance structures is negotiated. There appears 
to be strong variance in how much sovereignty in-
dividual actors are willing to defer to domestic ac-
tors, particularly in developing countries with weak 
governance capacities. As a consequence of their 
defiance towards domestic institutions, several of 
the global governance institutions discussed above – 
such as most prominently the World Bank and the 
Global Fund – continue to uphold their own paral-
lel governance mechanisms for coordination such as 
the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanism 
(CCM) or World Bank loans for national HIV/AIDS 
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programs that are coordinated through U.S. embas-
sies (Spicer, Aleshkina, Biesma, Brugha, Caceres, 
Chilundo, Chkhatarashvili, Harmer, Miege and 
Murzalieva 2010). A Global Fund Report on Aid Ef-
fectiveness evaluating progress in implementing the 
Paris Principles shows that while alignment between 
individual global agencies and national systems 
works quite well, harmonization between the Global 
Fund and other international actors at the national 
level is not at all (joint analytical reports) or very 
slowly progressing (joint missions) (GFATM 2009). 
The effects of contested principles and trajectories 
of harmonization on recipient countries’ governance 
capacities become also evident in evaluations of the 
role and position of National AIDS Commissions 
(NAC) in the coordination of donors and domestic 
agencies in national responses to AIDS (Dickinson, 
et al. 2008; England 2006; Putzel 2004). The Three 
Ones Principles as the broadest principles structuring 
much of the interplay between global agencies and 
national governments specifically call for the estab-
lishment of one national AIDS coordinating author-
ity. These authorities have, by now, been created in 
a large number of countries as the core institutional 
structure responsible for coordination of the national 
AIDS response.  It is within the NACs that, ideally, 
the Paris Principles of harmonization and alignment 
should create positive synergies for all actors in-
volved in the national AIDS response.19  NACs there-
fore occupy both a critical as well as an uncomfort-
able position in terms of domestic translations of the 
harmonization norm, inasmuch as they should serve 
as the deliberative forums within which domestic and 
international priorities, policies and programs are 
brought into line. The work of most NACs evidences 
that harmonization efforts between international ac-
tors and alignment between international and domes-
tic actors are often difficult to square – particularly 
where influential players such as, most importantly, 
the Global Fund retain their own coordination struc-
tures, thereby undermining the authority and sup-
posed leadership of the NAC in coordination the in-
put of external actors (Dickinson and Druce 2010). 
Yet, there is also accumulating evidence from the 
ground which shows that in some cases harmoniza-
tion of international actors can work extremely well 
both in terms of coherence and divisions of labor. 
This evidence suggests at least two things. First, that 
interorganizational harmonization works better in the 
earlier stages of the policy cycle – particularly in the 
preparation of projects and funding proposals and, to 
a lesser extent, in the implementation process (Grun-
dy 2010; World Bank 2011). It is to be assumed that 
during the earlier stages of the policy cycle there is 
more room for deliberation and discussion between 
the various stakeholders (e.g. in the many donor fo-
rums that have been established at the national lev-
el) and therefore also more room for negotiating a 
shared meaning of the harmonization norm. The least 
favourable area for harmonization is monitoring & 
evaluation where incentives for interorganizational 
cooperation in the mainstreaming of evaluation in-
dicators and the sharing of knowledge are very low 
(Holzscheiter, et al. 2012). Conflicts over authority 
seem to be unresolvable in this area, both because of 
the reluctance to share precious knowledge gained 
through expensive monitoring systems and of the 
prevailing interest in evaluations that allow identi-
fying the impact of individual organizations not the 
aggregate impact of a coordinated donor community. 
And secondly harmonization benefits from strong 
governance at national level as well as the trust of in-
ternational actors in local ownership (Spicer, Alesh-
kina, Biesma, Brugha, Caceres, Chilundo, Chkhata-
rashvili, Harmer, Miege and Murzalieva 2010). 
These are all important factors whose explanatory 
value should be explored in future research – both 
through cross-country comparison as well as com-
parison between different health issues and actors.
5. Conclusion
 
This paper has argued that norms are an important 
driver behind interorganizational convergence in 
global governance and that their study is essential 
in order to understand the systemic effects of inter-
organizational relations in any field of global gov-
ernance. Analyzing the effects of metagovernance 
norms and principles in the field of global health, 
it has uncovered two important findings: first, that 
there is an uncontested harmonization norm shared 
by all major international organizations in global 
health. This uncontestedness is reflected in the com-
prehensive and far-reaching translation of the “har-
monization norm” enshrined in the Paris Declara-
tion on Aid Effectiveness in discourses and actions 
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of these major IOs. Secondly, however, the analysis 
has shown the contested nature of the principles and 
trajectories attached to harmonization that motivate 
harmonization efforts between IOs. Even though all 
of these activities are driven by the desire of IOs and 
their member states to reorganize the regime com-
plex for health, the aggregate effects of interorgani-
zational convergence – particularly in the context of 
development cooperation – amount to hypercollec-
tive action. The paper has argued that such hypercol-
lective action is the result of a fierce interest among 
international actors in shaping the ‘ground rules’ 
of metagovernance that order the relationships be-
tween actors in fragmented governance landscapes. 
An approach that sees harmonization as a contest-
ed norm rather than an unquestioned principle and 
logical course of action permits not only to identify 
inconsistencies and truth claims in the discourse on 
institutional fragmentation. It also suggests that there 
are alternatives to such a forceful harmonization dis-
course. While this paper has limited itself to uncover 
the power of a global harmonization norm and IOs’ 
ambitions to shape the meaning of this norm (their 
power in discourse) a more comprehensive study 
would also tackle silencing and exclusion of alter-
native discourses, normative orders and modes of 
speaking (targeting, for example, the technical-mana-
gerial terminology and frames that dominate ‘harmo-
nization-talk’). Such a perspective ultimately helps 
to challenge the rationality behind convergence and 
harmonization that lies at the heart of contemporary 
attempts of restoring order in messy global health. As 
some critical voices remind us a counter-discourse 
is still around that equates institutional proliferation 
neither with greater efficiency and professionalism 
nor with ineffectiveness and ‘little value for money’ 
but with a healthy competition that “may help gener-
ate new ideas and energy for addressing the health 
needs of the poor” (Shiffman 2009). The Busan Part-
nership for Effective Development Cooperation of 
2011 is often seen as a hallmark of alternative dis-
courses on aid effectiveness, development and  good 
global governance in which pluralism (including 
value pluralism) and flexibility are emphasized as 
a counter-balance to the power of established donor 
institutions (Woods 2008; Woods 2011). From the 
vantage point of this counter-discourse, the harmoni-
zation norm can indeed be interpreted as the corner-
stone of a global institutional order that plays into the 
hands of established international organizations and 
their interest in maintaining a specific world order. 
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